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MANY CITIES, ONE NATION: A RESPONSE 
TO STEVEN SMITH’S PAGANS AND 
CHRISTIANS IN THE CITY 
BRUCE P. FROHNEN† 
Pagans and Christians in the City is a brilliant, important 
book that sheds new light on contemporary society’s angry 
malaise and bitter debates over public meaning.  Through 
penetrating analysis of human nature and the inevitable quest 
for the sacred in history, Smith provides new insight into modern 
man’s attempt to, in Eric Voegelin’s phrase, 
“immanentiz[e] . . . the eschaton.”1  Those working to excise 
symbols of the transcendent from public life and to remove 
Christianity’s “regulatory ideal”2 claim to be liberating 
individuals from oppression.  In reality, the modern pagan 
sacralization of this world chains people to political programs 
aimed at refashioning every aspect of our lives to suit current 
definitions of the good. 
Modern paganism is not merely non-Christian but post-
Christian, containing within itself attitudes and purposes 
developed through Christian culture and society.  Consequently, 
it cannot escape Christianity’s pursuit of a final resolution to 
life’s trials.  Instead it merely immanentizes this drive through 
pursuit of a historical culmination for terrestrial efforts in a kind 
of materialistic beatitude.  Within contemporary liberalism this 
means ever-greater, ever-broader liberation, in which a redefined 
individual will control all aspects of its life, and even its own 
definition of life, but always in accordance with contemporary 
standards of material equality and social justice.3  The inevitable 
conclusion, which Smith is too polite and prudent to make 
 
† Ella and Ernest Fisher Professor of Law, Ohio Northern University College of 
Law. Thanks are owed to Steve Smith, the organizers of this symposium, editors of 
this journal, and, for always-exemplary research assistance, Garrett Robinson, J.D., 
2019, ONU. 
1 ERIC VOEGELIN, THE NEW SCIENCE OF POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION 166 
(1952). 
2 STEVEN D. SMITH, PAGANS AND CHRISTIANS IN THE CITY: CULTURE WARS 
FROM THE TIBER TO THE POTOMAC 195 (2018) [hereinafter PAGANS AND CHRISTIANS]. 
3 See generally BRUCE FROHNEN, THE NEW COMMUNITARIANS AND THE CRISIS 
OF MODERN LIBERALISM (1996). 
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explicit, is summed up by his muse, T.S. Eliot: “If you will not 
have God (and He is a jealous God) you should pay your respects 
to Hitler or Stalin.”4  When daily life and the state both are not 
only valued but fully sacralized, there is no logical stopping point 
for political control; the result is stultifying conformity and may 
well include mass, murderous violence, whether in the name of 
racial dominance, material equality, or protecting individuals 
from the terrors of microaggressions. 
Smith approaches modern paganism’s totalitarian impulses 
somewhat obliquely by noting that the realm of activity deemed 
suitable for regulation (in his phrase “the walls of the city”) has 
expanded so far into previously private (I would say social) life 
that no room is left for religion or any other form of conduct to 
escape political control and possible censure.5  The result is not 
mere re-paganization.  Today’s pagan state is far more effective 
and extensive than its predecessors.  The Roman state, for 
example, was checked and limited by the (often unjust and even 
brutal) institution of the paterfamilias.  The father was a tyrant 
in his own household and this often produced oppression for all 
those he ruled, but this tyranny checked and limited the tyranny 
of the state.6  Today, the family itself has been made into a 
political tool, as Smith shows in his discussion of recent Supreme 
Court decisions regarding sexual conduct, especially Obergefell v. 
Hodges and its aftermath.7  
In his treatment of contemporary legal issues and, more 
deeply, his analysis of the manner in which changing religious 
assumptions and goals shape the culture from which law 
naturally grows, Smith has provided both a strong critique of 
contemporary “secular” pieties and an explanation for the culture 
wars so often derided or minimized by those most determined to 
 
4 T.S. ELIOT, THE IDEA OF A CHRISTIAN SOCIETY 80–81 (1948). 
5 PAGANS AND CHRISTIANS, supra note 2, at 339–40. 
6 The following funeral inscription illustrates the importance of the station of 
paterfamilias: 
By my good conduct I heaped virtues on the virtues of my clan; I begat a 
family and sought to equal the exploits of my father. I upheld the praise of 
my ancestors, so that they are glad that I was created of their line. My 
honors have ennobled my stock. 
4 E.H. WARMINGTON, REMAINS OF OLD LATIN 2–9 (1940), in 1 ROMAN CIVILIZATION 
524 (Naphtali Lewis and Meyer Reinhold eds., 3d ed., 1990). Justinian also 
emphasized male control over his immediate family and his wards. JUSTINIAN, 
INSTITUTES, i, ix, in 2 ROMAN CIVILIZATION 341 (Naphtali Lewis and Meyer 
Reinhold eds., 3d ed., 1990). 
7 PAGANS AND CHRISTIANS, supra note 2, at 274. 
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deconstruct traditional culture.  Still, I would argue that Smith’s 
wide-ranging, radical rethinking of contemporary social disorder 
does not go far enough.  As Smith’s discussion of contemporary 
judicial treatment of social structure makes clear, today’s legal 
elites are at heart totalitarian in their concern to reshape all of 
society and all of human nature and belief.  Theirs is a concern 
with the very nature of our character as humans.  As such they 
are operating, often overtly, as lawgivers; they seek to re-found 
the social order in accordance with their own conception of the 
good and their own regulatory means and ends.  Lawgiving at 
heart is not a legal but a political act in that it seeks to make a 
people through law, rather than make particular laws to suit a 
given people.  In practical terms, it requires the concentration of 
power in the hands of some one or few persons claiming the right 
and wisdom to determine the proper character of the people and 
how to achieve it.8 
Such projects for centuries have been associated with the 
early modern political theorist Niccolo Machiavelli—in some 
ways the founder of modern political science.  In particular, 
Machiavelli was convinced that political rulers, whether princes 
or republican leaders, must stamp out various forms of 
“corruption,” by which he meant loyalties standing in the way of 
state power and influence.9  Machiavelli’s self-conscious  
 
 
8 It should come as no surprise that the god-like role of the lawgiver has ancient 
roots, going back to ancient conceptions of the king as creator of literal as well as 
legal order out of chaos. See BRIAN BIX, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT ch. 
1 (7th ed., 2015). Plato also seems to harbor an aversion to the rule of law as an 
obstacle to “wise rule,” wherein the ruler with “expertise” commands without 
mediation: 
And whether they [i.e. the ruler(s)] purge the city for its benefit by putting 
some people to death or else by exiling them, or whether again they make it 
smaller by sending out colonies somewhere like swarms of bees, or build it 
up by introducing people from somewhere outside and making them 
citizens—so long as they act to preserve it on the basis of expert knowledge 
and what is just, making it better than it was so far as they can, this is the 
constitution which alone we must say is correct, under these conditions and 
in accordance with criteria of this sort. 
PLATO, STATESMAN 293d-e (C.J. Rowe trans.), in PLATO: COMPLETE WORKS 337 
(John M. Cooper ed., 1997).  
9 J.G.A. Pocock discusses, as an example, the threat to the state Machiavelli 
perceived in the castle-holding lords outside of cities. See J.G.A. POCOCK, THE 
MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT 209–11. In a similar way, Machiavelli, as well as his 
intellectual descendants, distrust [Catholic] Christianity, because “it taught men to 
give themselves to ends other than the city’s and to love their own souls more than 
the fatherland.” Id. at 202. 
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resuscitation of ancient notions of virtue also was a rejection of 
the idea that subjects and citizens might be loyal to associations 
other than the city without becoming enemies of the state.10 
My concern is that Smith’s analysis remains wedded to the 
prejudices of this early modern political science, most especially 
its monistic conception of political society and its sovereignty.  In 
its very title, “Pagans and Christians in the City” this book 
furthers the modern error of assuming societies, and indeed 
civilizations, can be summed up in terms of a single unit.  In so 
doing, and despite some bows toward individual conscience and 
religious community, Smith fails to question in any full sense the 
modern view that there must be some center of power and 
authority, some single, particular common source of authority 
and definition of the common good.  Along this line, Smith 
defends the vision of “a city or a political community that 
respects and is open to transcendence” and laments repudiation 
of “the generically, implicitly Christian city that Americans have 
inherited.”11  But societies—in contemporary terms nations—are 
not cities, and to equate a city with a political community today 
is to perpetuate that longstanding, mistaken view that political 
structures, and especially the nation-state, are the sole proper 
locus of affection and loyalty; that the nation is a community 
rather than a collection of smaller, more natural and 
fundamental associations. 
I’ve stated this criticism much too baldly.  Smith’s repetition 
of the “Whig” version of history, in which religion and community 
are shucked off over time to make way for a liberated 
individualism, clearly is told in part as a means of elucidating 
the origins of today’s atavistic atomism.  Still, some of these 
assumptions underly his discussion of debates over religious 
freedom in America and so are worth questioning.  In particular, 
as we confront modern paganism’s totalitarian impulses, it is 
good to remember the limits of Christian political claims.  For 
example, Augustine, and later Thomas Aquinas, advised against 
too vigorous a pursuit of the good in this life, for example by 
sanctioning practices like prostitution, because he recognized the 
inevitability of sin, the limits of law, and the damage done to 
 
10 See, e.g., id. at 202, 210–11. 
11 PAGANS AND CHRISTIANS, supra note 2, at 303. 
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society through political overreaching.12  Through the process of 
re-paganization, then, we are not merely exchanging one totalist 
vision of society for another, but replacing a more limited, hence 
intrinsically more tolerant, notion for one that, perhaps 
ironically, lacks the will or ability to tolerate multiple loyalties or 
deep dissent over the long term. 
The absolutist strain of politics mis-identified with Medieval 
Europe is an early modern invention based on a mis-reading of 
ancient examples and aimed at solidifying the nation-state.  It 
undermines that multiplicity of authorities, including legal 
jurisdictions, at the heart of ordered liberty, including, of course, 
religious liberty.13  Aristotle argued that the polis—today 
mistranslated as “city-state” but actually meaning “city-
community”—requires a kind of friendship dependent on 
commonality.  Aristotle’s city-communities—Athens, Sparta, and 
so on—were tight-knit, tribal groupings fighting for survival and 
dominance in a pitiless world.  They were total communities in 
which freedom, slavery, and structures of life down to whether 
the people would eat in their homes or at common messes, were 
considered issues of crucial public importance. 14  Many good 
things came from the polis but limited government, ordered 
liberty, and the rule of law were not among them.  As to the 
modern rebirth of the polis, that way lies the revolutionary terror 
of the guillotine.15 
Less oddly than might seem, the alternative to the all-
encompassing polis is the nation.  Aristotle described the nation 
as the alternative to the city-community; his nation was of a 
particular sort, however, in that he described the nation in terms 
and in reference to ancient empires—that is, as an alliance made 
up of smaller, more natural associations.16  Rome attempted to 
maintain the nature of a city while running an empire.  Over the 
long run this attempt failed to work for the republic or, 
 
12 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, pt. II-II, Q. 10, art. 11 (English 
Dominican Friars eds., The Aquinas Institute for the Study of Sacred Doctrine, 
2012). 
13 See generally BERTRAND DE JOUVENEL, SOVEREIGNTY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE 
POLITICAL GOOD (J.F. Huntington, trans., 1997) (1957). 
14 1 GIOVANNI SARTORI, THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY REVISITED 278–81 (1987). 
15 For the excesses of the leaders of Revolutionary France against individuals 
and entire cities viewed harmful to the patrie, see SIMON SCHAMA, CITIZENS: A 
CHRONICAL OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 783–86, 789–92 (1989). 
16 ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, 1276a 26–31. Aristotle, Politics 64 (Stephen Everson 
ed., B. Jowett trans., 1996) (noting the difference between a Greek polis as a single 
city-state and the comparatively immense Babylon). 
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eventually, the empire itself.  That said, it is worth remembering 
that the Roman Empire lasted as long as it did by providing 
maximum autonomy to local peoples’ associations and 
institutions.  Formerly independent kingdoms might retain the 
bulk of their previous way of life by surrendering control over 
their foreign policy to Rome and, of course, paying tribute.17  
Over time, Christendom replaced Rome as an empire of 
empires—a complex network of overlapping and even competing 
legal and political jurisdictions rooted in local ties.  Through most 
of its history the United States fit, in broad terms, this imperial 
pattern and thereby allowed for religious, spiritual, and political 
liberty of a kind not found in Rome or any ancient city.  That 
imperial pattern of nationhood sometimes goes by the name 
“federalism,” but only federalism of the kind practiced during the 
early republic—that is, one that in contemporary terms would be 
deemed a strict, locality-centered sort.18  One prominent, 
indicative example is provided by that strict constructionist, 
Thomas Jefferson.  In a letter to James Madison, Jefferson 
predicted a successful expansion of the American union in any 
conflict with European power; with such an eventuality, “we 
should have such an empire for liberty as [the world] has never 
surveyed since the creation: & I am persuaded no constitution 
was ever before so well calculated as ours for extensive empire & 
self government.”19  The loosely-structured American republic, 
precisely because of its loose structure, was capable of fostering 
self-government over a wide geographic expanse—of becoming an 
extensive “empire for liberty.” 
The paradigm within which Smith operates is of “one nation 
under God”—in which “the determination of what the 
transcendent authority demands will be left to individuals.”20  
Smith himself criticizes what little discipline exists in Supreme 
Court treatment of individual claims of conscience on the 
 
17 The trial of Jesus furnishes an example of the Roman Empire’s respect for the 
law of the peoples over which it “ruled.” See Luke 23:6-11 (Douay-Rheims) (Wherein 
Pilate realizes that Jesus belongs to the jurisdiction of Herod and sends Jesus to 
him). 
18 Note that even the supposedly “pro-federalism” argument of the Supreme 
Court in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) accepts that Congress has the 
power to regulate activities that are not themselves interstate commerce but merely 
affect it. 
19 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, (Apr. 27, 1809), in 1 THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: RETIREMENT SERIES 4 MARCH 1809 TO 15 
NOVEMBER 1809, 169 (J. Jefferson Looney ed., 2004). 
20 PAGANS AND CHRISTIANS, supra note 2, at 326. 
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grounds that it establishes a “sovereign community” in the zone 
of religious freedom, denying religious accommodation on 
political grounds.21  This is to misread the nature of religion and 
constitutionalism in the United States from before the founding 
through the nineteenth century and, in much of the country, to 
this day. 
The word “religion” derives from a root meaning “to bind,” 
and, as adopted by the medieval, it referred in particular to 
religious and liturgical life.22  It is a social and communal as 
much as an individual and theological institution and practice.  
This fact was recognized at the founding when Massachusetts, 
Connecticut, and New Hampshire all implemented a plan of 
religious assessments (legislatively enacted but not implemented 
in Maryland and Georgia, rejected after vigorous debate in 
Virginia) that taxed all citizens for the support of religion.  The 
result was not established churches as generally understood, but 
rather support for religious communities as each citizen directed 
his tax monies to the church of his choice.23  The battle over local 
“establishments” was long and contested, involving as it did 
hatred of Catholics, frontier reliance on limited clerical resources, 
and the rise of a nationalizing civil religion.24  It was not 
definitively “won” by nationalist secularizers until incorporation 
of the religion clause by the Supreme Court beginning with its 
decision in Everson v. Board of Education.25 
Smith certainly is not ignorant of the necessity of limitations 
on power for ordered liberty, or of the development of religious 
freedom in part, at least, through the maintenance of multiple 
foci of power.  He rightly points out how the so-called papal 
revolution of the early Middle Ages, separating religious and 
secular jurisdictions, fostered growth of the rule of law.  But I 
wish he had taken more seriously the importance of overlapping 
and competing jurisdictions for the development of 
constitutionalism as shown by Harold Berman and Kenneth 
 
21 Id. at 327. 
22 William T. Cavanaugh, “A Fire Strong Enough to Consume the House”: The 
Wars of Religion and the Rise of the State, 11 MOD. THEOLOGY 397, 404 (1995). 
23 See Exhibition, Religion and the Founding of the American Republic: Religion 
and the State Governments, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/rel 
igion/rel05.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2019). 
24 See generally PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (4th 
prtg. 2004) (2002). 
25 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
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Pennington, among others.26  As it is, he presents a simplified 
“two-swords” version that repeats the Whig fallacy of a march 
toward secular individualism; the notion of two separate but 
equal powers—the ecclesiastical and the secular—captures only 
part of the mesh of contending powers that was medieval 
Europe.27  To begin, the two-swords theory ceded to secular 
authorities the power to make laws for religious as well as 
political institutions and persons.28  The Church in early 
Christian Europe was dominated by secular authorities and 
purposes to the point that it could not be said to have wielded 
any separate power.29  In continuity with pagan practice, kings 
were in essence tribal leaders, chief judges of their peoples, and 
sacred rulers superior to clerics of all ranks and types.30  But the 
institutional separation achieved over time was neither clean nor 
along any strict, “sacred-secular” line; there were more than two 
jurisdictions of law, more than two levels and loci of political 
authority, even, showing how mistaken contemporary claims of 
the inevitability of modern sovereignty truly are.31  Conflicts over 
the extent (and temporal length) of the right of sanctuary, 
definitions of the ecclesiastical sphere, and the reach of royal, 
merchant, and local laws all enhanced the ability of persons and 
communities to carve out room for self-government.32  
The history of the Medieval Church is filled with evidence of 
the connections between liberty and the multiplicity of 
associations, each with important rights.  Cathedral chapters 
competed with Bishops for power and funds; domestic houses, 
diocese, and even the Church as a whole all were treated at law 
as corporations with their own chartered as well as intrinsic 




26 See, e.g., KENNETH PENNINGTON, THE PRINCE AND THE LAW (1993); HAROLD 
J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL 
TRADITION (1983). 
27 PAGANS AND CHRISTIANS, supra note 2, at 311–15. 
28 BERMAN, supra note 26, at 92. 
29 Id. at 88. 
30 Id. at 89. 
31 For the role of cities in this patchwork of jurisdictions, see id. at 395; for the 
development of institutional checks on monarchs through charters, see id. at 501–
05. See also David J. Bederman, Diversity and Permeability in Transnational 
Governance, 57 EMORY L.J. 201, 213 (2007). 
32 See generally Bruce P. Frohnen, The One and the Many: Individual Rights, 
Corporate Rights and the Diversity of Groups, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 789 (2005). 
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And the corporation with a higher position within the supposedly 
unquestioned, absolute hierarchy was not always on the winning 
side of such litigation.33 
In the American context as well, Smith repeats the monist 
fallacy.  Focusing on Madison and Jefferson he presents a picture 
of religious liberty as a conflict between the individual and the 
(usually political) community.34  The Jeffersonian vision, so 
sacred to today’s elites, was aimed only at the “general” 
government, not intended to interfere with state and local 
practices.35  Moreover, even as regards the federal government, 
Jefferson’s vision was only one, extreme take on religious 
liberty.36  It was not reflected, for example, in the abiding 
recognition of Christianity as part of the common law of 
American jurisdictions through the nineteenth century,37 of 
American courts’ insistence on upholding laws against 
blasphemy,38 or of the decision in the case of Reynolds v. United 
States39 (noted by Smith) upholding America’s Christian cultural 
character and foundation in monogamous marriage.  Smith’s 
focus on the Jeffersonian vision in opposition to the mainstream 
of legal and constitutional practice privileges liberalism’s 
individual/state binary, hiding the role of federalism in 
maintaining religious community and liberty in creative tension. 
The connections among a diversity of authorities, the 
consequent political liberty, and religious liberty are both deep 
and close.  It was not federalism as a merely structural entity 
that allowed for associational and especially religious liberty in 
the United States.  Administrative decentralization in the United 
States, like that in Medieval Europe, encouraged a diversity of 
faiths and institutions at the local level along with a more 
 
33 See Rights and the Cathedral Chapter, in CHARLES REID, RIGHTS IN 
THIRTEENTH-CENTURY CANON LAW: AN HISTORICAL INVESTIGATION (May 1995) 
(unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Cornell University) (on file with author). For a 
discussion of how this corporate understanding related to secular law and rights as 
well, see Brian Tierney, Religion and Rights: A Medieval Perspective, 5 J.L. & 
RELIGION 163, 170 (1987). 
34 PAGANS AND CHRISTIANS, supra note 2, at 326–27. 
35 See, e.g., Jefferson’s Second Inaugural Address and Letter to Reverend Samuel 
Miller, in THE SACRED RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE 530–31 (Daniel L. Dreisbach & Mark 
David Hall eds., 2010) [hereinafter THE SACRED RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE]. 
36 See id. at ch. 13 
37 See, e.g., Joseph Story, Christianity a Part of the Common Law, in THE 
SACRED RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE, supra note 35, at 551–52. 
38 See, e.g., People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290 (N.Y. 1811). 
39 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
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general spirit of local self-government.  As Alexis de Tocqueville 
pointed out, liberty is lived at a level more local than either the 
federal or the state.  It is participation in political life that gives 
people the capacity and the desire to both protect self-
government and to make it work.  What this meant in the 
American context was a streak of independence rooted in 
practical life within family, church, and a variety of local 
associations, fostering a “science of association.”40  It was this 
science which allowed Americans to put into practice the Puritan 
combination of the spirit of religion and the spirit of liberty.41  
The spirit of religion was necessary for the spirit of liberty 
because it maintained a moral order within each person’s soul 
and within the community as a whole, in large measure by 
recognizing each person’s natural propensity to form 
associations.42 
The bulk of Smith’s discussion of religion understandably 
concerns post-Civil War developments.  Unfortunately, he 
accepts the cultural and political presumptions underlying 
contemporary readings of the Fourteenth Amendment.  One need 
hold no brief for racism to recognize the limits of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s intended reach, or to recognize the radical 
implications of the revisionist history thereof.43  Smith’s largely 
individualist response to the problems of religion clause 
jurisprudence rests on acceptance of incorporation—the 
foundation of the nationalized church of secularism and 
individual conscience.  It may be necessary for a practicing 
lawyer to accept the reality of incorporation, but to understand 
the roots of today’s angry malaise requires recognition that the 
destruction of federalism was central to this development. 
It is in the area of civil religion that Smith’s analysis 
becomes most troubling.  He relies on Robert Bellah’s definition 
of civil religion as a set of rituals and norms binding Americans 
together as a nation.44  Bellah’s goal was a national community—
a self-evidently contradictory concept—on the basis of beliefs that 
on even cursory inspection are simply political.  He demanded 
 
40 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 492 (Harvey C. Mansfield 
& Delba Winthrop trans. and eds., 2000). 
41 Id. at 43. 
42 Id. at 89–90. 
43 The classic response to such revisionism remains RAOUL BERGER, 
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT (2d. ed., 1997) (1977). 
44 PAGANS AND CHRISTIANS, supra note 2, at 295. 
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socialism as the true message of his version of Christianity.  In 
brief, Bellah sought to immanentize the eschaton in an all-
encompassing national edifice held together by political and legal 
forces.  Smith’s choice of Bellah as an exemplar of a lost vision of 
the Christian city is deeply unfortunate. 
Again, my criticism no doubt appears more harsh than I 
intend.  There is much in Smith’s narrative to show that he is 
presenting the rise of a problematic individualism and that this 
rise is in opposition to something deeper and more 
communitarian.45  Still, Smith’s references to his The Agnostic 
Constitution show a troubling lack of concern with the role of 
federalism and local communalism in understanding religion’s 
role in American public life.46  It is true that religion increasingly 
has come to mean simple individual “conscience” to the exclusion 
of transcendent standards of belief and conduct.47  At least as 
important, however, has been the undermining of constitutional 
religious “agnosticism” through the destruction of meaningful 
federalism, splintering not just the constitutional structure, but 
the cultural reality it was intended to protect. 
The “agnostic constitution” was agnostic only because and to 
the extent that the mechanisms of the national government were 
set upon and intended primarily to protect the more natural, 
local, and specifically religion-based societies existing within the 
states and their localities.  When the many cities in our states 
came to be seen as interlopers competing for attention and 
affection belonging to one, sacred nation, their religions also 
came to be seen as enemies of a single, common, and 
overwhelmingly political culture.  This was the point at which 
religious practice was brought under federal control so that it 
might be contained, shaped, and eventually forced out of the 
public mind.  From a variety of accommodations we were pushed 
into a situation where lawyers were called upon to define a 
precise divide between religious and secular life to the detriment 
of both, as the one was forced out of public space and the other 
sought with increasing desperation to make beatitude achievable 
within history. 
Whether in Christendom or within the cities of the American 
states, genuine religious community, rooted in transcendent 
standards and beliefs, brought conflict as well as cooperation.  
 
45 Id. at 312. 
46 Id. at 295–96. 
47 Id. at 330. 
36 JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 57:25   
But this conflict bred freedom and self-government because it 
limited the reach and effectiveness of any centralized authority.  
It also bred genuine religious belief and conduct because that 
belief mattered to public as well as private life and was treated 
as foundational and a worthy subject of strong debate.  The 
“dissidence of dissent”48 that brought about the American 
Revolution fostered a society of overlapping and competing 
cultures, jurisdictions, and beliefs.  It ruled out certain 
practices—most prominently polygamy.  It allowed for a wide 
variety of beliefs and ways of life.  When it was stifled by 
nationalizing forces and laws the religious spirit was stifled as 
well.49 
In brief, I wish Steve Smith in what in many ways is a 
masterful work had integrated into it the understanding that 
centralization itself is the enemy of liberty, including religious 
liberty, and that modern political religion, with its commitment 
to fundamental transformation, does not merely sacralize daily 
life, it stakes a claim to the sacred nature of its own political 
program, degrading the status, importance, and safety of 
religious (and other) associations.  Centralized power by nature 
is a danger to freedom and responsibility because it establishes 
tyranny in the old sense of a political leader’s ability to act 
according to will rather than law.50 
The danger of centralization is real within religious as well 
as political associations.  Here I would reference in particular 
current scandals within the Catholic church, which many have 
traced to errors they believe made their way into canon law and 
church administration following on Vatican I.  Whatever one 
makes of the necessity and wisdom of some of these changes, it is 
important to note that the church before that time was 
significantly decentralized and that laymen actually had more 
influence on and ability to check ecclesiastical power before the 
revised canon law of 1917 put the clergy and the hierarchy in 
particular beyond the reach of most counter-influences within 
and among the associations making up that church.51 
 
48 EDMUND BURKE, SPEECH ON CONCILIATION WITH AMERICA 22 (Hammond 
Lamont ed., 1897). 
49 See generally ROBERT NISBET, THE QUEST FOR COMMUNITY (Intercollegiate 
Studies Institute 2010) (1953). 
50 THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison). 
51 See generally Bronwen McShea, Bishops Unbound: The History Behind 
Today’s Crisis of Church Leadership, FIRST THINGS, Jan. 2019, at 33. 
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It may (or may not) be the case that “we can’t turn back the 
clock” toward a more decentralized understanding of both church 
and state.  But it seems wise to remember, as we face ever-
increasing demands for greater centralization of power in the 
name of social justice that the justice of free self-government was 
borne of decentralization. 
